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Digest: Musaelian v. Adams
Julie Sarto
Opinion by Werdegar, J., expressing the unanimous view of
the court.
Issue
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.71 can
attorney’s fees be awarded to a party who represented him or
herself in responding to a filing abuse?
Facts
Joseph Reiter, represented by Attorney William L. Adams,
obtained a default judgment against Andrew Musaelian and
Andrew Musaelian’s business, Attorney Legal Research (ALR).2
Reiter sought partial satisfaction of this judgment through a
forced sale of a residence owned jointly by Andrew Musaelian
and his wife, Mary Musaelian.3 Seeking to avoid the sale, Mary
Musaelian filed a third party claim of ownership.4 When the
Superior Court denied this claim, the Musaelians sought to
protect their home by filing for chapter 13 relief in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California.5
Still seeking to satisfy the judgment against Andrew Musaelian
and ALR, Reiter filed claims against the bankruptcy estate.6
However, the bankruptcy court dismissed the claim against ALR,
reasoning that it could be satisfied only from ALR’s assets, which
did not include the Musaelian’s home.7
Based on Reiter’s attempts to force the sale of the
Musaelian’s residence to satisfy the default judgment entered
against ALR, Mary Musaelian then filed this suit against Reiter
and Adams, seeking damages on theories of negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process,

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West 2006).
Musaelian v. Adams, 198 P.3d 560, 561 (Cal. 2009). Reiter brought suit seeking
damages for conduct relating to litigation between him and one of ALR’s clients. Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
1
2
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slander of title, invasion of privacy, and malicious prosecution.8
Adams, representing himself and, joined by Reiter, demurred on
the grounds that the first five causes of action were subject to the
litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, and that the sixth
cause of action for malicious prosecution lacked merit because
the state court action had terminated in Reiter’s favor.9 They
additionally moved under section 128.7 for sanctions, including
attorney fees against Mary Musaelian and her attorney.10
In sustaining Adams’ and Reiter’s demurrers without leave
to amend, the trial court also granted the motions for sanctions,
ordering Mary Musaelian and her attorney to pay $25,050 to
Adams as “reasonable sanctions including attorney fees.”11
Reversing the award of attorney fees to Adams, the court of
appeal concluded that because Adams had represented himself,
he had not “incurred” attorney fees for purposes of sanctions
under section 128.7.12
Analysis
The court first noted that, in California, following the
“American Rule” and codified in Code of Civil Procedure section
1021, each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay its own
The measures and modes of attorney
attorney fees.13
compensation are left to the agreement of the parties “[e]xcept as
attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute.”14 The
court then acknowledged that California Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.7 was such a statute.15 Section 128.7 requires that
parties and their attorneys certify that pleadings or other written
materials presented to the courts have merit “to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”16 Sanctions are
authorized for violations of the section:
A sanction imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to
what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. . . . [T]he sanction may consist of,
or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 562; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 2006).
Musaelian, 198 P.3d at 562 (citing § 1021).
Id.
Id. (citing § 1021(b)).
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some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.17

Next, the court looked to Trope v. Katz,18 where the court
held that the phrase “attorney’s fees” in Civil Code section 1717
does not include compensation for an attorney’s time and effort
spent representing him or herself or for professional business
opportunities lost as a result of self-representation.19 The words
“incur” and “attorney’s fees” were examined and their ordinary
and usual meanings were found to imply an agency relationship
inconsistent with self-representation.20 The general meaning of
“incur” is “to become liable,” and “attorney’s fees” is the
consideration a litigant actually pays or becomes liable to pay in
exchange for legal representation; “[a]n attorney litigating in
The court
propria persona pays no such compensation.”21
reasoned that the language in section 128.7 should be interpreted
in a similar manner and found that the inclusion of the words
“incur” and “attorney’s fees” in this section also implied an
agency relationship where the client and the attorney are not one
and the same, and where the attorney expects remuneration.22
The court additionally found that the statute viewed
attorney’s fees as an expense and authorized a court to impose
sanctions in the form of “reasonable attorney’s fees and other
expenses incurred.”23 The word “expense” is associated with an
obligation to pay, and a party who acts on his or her own behalf
does not produce an expense that the party is obligated to pay. 24
Nor do lost earnings that a self-represented litigant might have
obtained, but for devoting time to representing him or herself in
litigation, constitute an expense.25
The court acknowledged that two California appellate court
cases upheld awards of attorney fees, both having identified a
need to compensate parties who had been compelled to respond
to bad faith tactics.26 Furthermore, the court noted that these
courts found that to disallow an award of attorney’s fees to selfrepresented attorneys would create “a separate and artificial
category of litigants who would be inadequately protected against

Id. (citing § 1021(d)) (emphasis omitted).
902 P.2d 259 (Cal. 1995).
Musaelian, 198 P.3d at 562.
20 Id.
21 Id. (italics added).
22 Id.
23 Id. (citing § 1021(d)) (emphasis omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 563.
26 Id. (discussing Abandonato v. Coldren, 41 Cal. App. 4th 264 (1995) and Laborde v.
Aronson, 92 Cal. App. 4th 459 (2001)).
17
18
19
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another party’s sanctionable activities.”27 The court found this
reasoning to be inconsistent with the primary purpose of section
128.7—to deter filing abuses, not to compensate those affected by
them.28 This purpose would not suffer if attorney fees are not
allowed for attorneys representing themselves.29 The court was
not concerned that a party that engaged in abusive filing
practices would have been able to avoid monetary sanctions
simply because the opposing party was a self-represented
attorney—because section 128.7 provides the trial court with a
wide range of options, all of which are designed to deter filing
abuses.30
Holding
The court held that an award of monetary sanctions for
frivolous litigation tactics under Code of Civil Procedure section
128.7 could include an award of attorney fees in favor of an
attorney who represented him or herself.
Legal Significance
This decision reaffirms the idea that the phrase “attorney
fees” does not include compensation for the time and effort
attorneys expend representing themselves or for professional
business opportunities lost because of self-representation. It
extends its application to section 128.7. As a result of this
decision, an attorney who responds pro se to a filing abuse may
not recover sanctions under section 128.7 in the form of an award
of attorney fees.

27 Id. (discussing Abandonato v. Coldren, 41 Cal. App. 4th 264 (1995) and Laborde v.
Aronson, 92 Cal. App. 4th 459 (2001)).
28 Id. at 564.
29 Id.
30 Id.

